Following the largely undecided First Punic War, the dispute of the island of Sicily remained a controversy between Rome and Carthage. Carthage, especially, felt that the war had left far too many conditions in Rome's favour.
As such, beginning in 218 B.C., Carthage began a military campaign against Rome's allies in Hispania. Carthage, while a naval power, feared Rome's navy. Carthage believed it could avoid a confrontation with Rome's navy by walking from Hispania all the way to Italia.
Carthage's campaign was largely unhindered throughout its march until the Battle of Trebia. Having escaped behind the river of Trebia, Rome had the high ground against Carthage and Carthage was unable to move forward across the river. As an unusual alternative tactic, Carthage decided to move its troops north across the Alps. Carthage's forces consisted of large variety of troops, including forces it had collected in Hispania and modern-day Southern France, but most particularly war elephants, a weapon which struck fear into Roman hearts.
Following the harsh travels across the Alps, Carthage had lost many men, but managed to regain new troops in Northern Italy from defeated allies of Rome. Rome itself had fled to its capital, fearing Carthage's army. Despite its military success, Carthage was unable to take on the well-fortified city of Rome, and instead lured around the Roman countryside wrecking havoc in an attempt to lure out Roman forces.
And it worked; in 216 B.C., Rome - seeking a quick end to the war - sent out its troops to fight in the Battle of Cannae. The first battle ever to become known as a battle of annihilation, the entire Roman forces was squeezed together by Carthage's forces until they were all killed. In a mere 10 hours, Carthage had managed to kill at least 45,000 Roman troops.
However, despite Carthage's obvious military tactic advantage, it remained unable to capture Rome and was forced to return home to Carthage as its alliances fell around it. Carthage suffered a huge defeat in the end, as it became a client state of Rome, unable to raise an army without Rome's permission and more. However, despite these conditions, Rome was not yet done with Carthage.
That's some TITanic clash indeed, lol...If only I was in the middle, being sandwiched :P.
Anyhow, I've always thought that Hannibal's most important tactical mistake was not to head to Rome after Cannae. It is true, Rome had way larger armies than Carthage, Hannibal was pretty much isolated from getting reinforcements and he lacked siege weapons like towers and rams. But, maybe pushing into Rome would have made the Romans want to defend their land instead of going to Hispania and Sicilia and so, maybe, the punic and their allied forces would have gotten enough 'free space' to help Hannibal in Italy and suffocate Rome. Even if Hannibal's march to Rome ended as a defeat, at least it would have been a defeat in Italy and that could have been quite adventageous for Carthage (as opposed to a defeat in Africa as it happened, and whose outcome was a defenseless and isolated Carthage). But yeah..I've always been very pro-punic, even tho I'm sure I wouldn't exist if history was different from how it actually happened. When Hannibal failed to defeat Rome, he made it (her?) stronger. As they say: "What doesn't kill me, just makes me stronger" and it can't be truer, lol.
It's intersting how the traditional ally of Carthage (Rome) bacame its enemy and how the traditional enemy of the punic city, Syracuse, allied with Carthage both for the first and second punic wars. But it is sad that due to the carelessness of the Roman invasive forces, Archimedes, the most gifted mind of his time, was killed after Syracuse was taken by the legions.
@Djoser: Yes. Part of the reason the Roman armies were quite inefficient, despite their size was due to how the military in Rome was structured at the time. Rather than paid soldiers, it was just noblemen paying for their own equipment. This meant bad moral and unreliable soldiers in general. Size of arms doesn't always matter, you know.
@Anon: I assume you forgot the wrapper for this one's title. Hmm... I apologise, but my OCD is going mad when inconsistencies are about.
I don't remember this well...it was Marius who re-structured the legions most deeply? Carhaginian troops on the other hand were mostly mercenaries, they were paid to fight and they weren't bad at it...however if money ran short, one would be in serious trouble, because as expected, mercenaries'loyalty isn't too reliable when funds get short (the reason behind the Truceless War: 241-238 B.C. where as a side effect after mercenary rebellions, Rome was able to take Sardinia from Carthage, as an 'indemnization'). Even in Il Principe, Machiavelli stated that mercenaries were not the best choice for an army and used Carthage as an example. I wonder if besides their commanders, were there any punic soldiers. Do you know something about it, Svip?
@Djoser: Yes, Marius is the guy I am thinking of. His reforms to the military was one of the most important events in Roman history. But this occurred after the Second Punic War (in fact, part of the inspiration for his reforms stemmed from this war).
I am not saying mercenaries are perfect, but Hannibal managed to use them in an ingenious way; a way that would not be seen again until the 19th century. At the time - and thus afterwards - it was not done to put different types of soldiers in the same divisions.
But to answer your question; yes, there were punic soldiers involved. It was only after the Second Punic War that Carthage was disallowed from forming an army. But please remember, standing armies were not a concept until the 18th century and the introduction of conscripts, till then armies were only created in war time or used as guards. And they were often mercenaries or some similar form.
@Anon: The statement is supposed to refer to the Third Punic War, which was the final blow to Carthage.
![Historines: Second Punic War [Commissions]](./content/584.png)
As such, beginning in 218 B.C., Carthage began a military campaign against Rome's allies in Hispania. Carthage, while a naval power, feared Rome's navy. Carthage believed it could avoid a confrontation with Rome's navy by walking from Hispania all the way to Italia.
Carthage's campaign was largely unhindered throughout its march until the Battle of Trebia. Having escaped behind the river of Trebia, Rome had the high ground against Carthage and Carthage was unable to move forward across the river. As an unusual alternative tactic, Carthage decided to move its troops north across the Alps. Carthage's forces consisted of large variety of troops, including forces it had collected in Hispania and modern-day Southern France, but most particularly war elephants, a weapon which struck fear into Roman hearts.
Following the harsh travels across the Alps, Carthage had lost many men, but managed to regain new troops in Northern Italy from defeated allies of Rome. Rome itself had fled to its capital, fearing Carthage's army. Despite its military success, Carthage was unable to take on the well-fortified city of Rome, and instead lured around the Roman countryside wrecking havoc in an attempt to lure out Roman forces.
And it worked; in 216 B.C., Rome - seeking a quick end to the war - sent out its troops to fight in the Battle of Cannae. The first battle ever to become known as a battle of annihilation, the entire Roman forces was squeezed together by Carthage's forces until they were all killed. In a mere 10 hours, Carthage had managed to kill at least 45,000 Roman troops.
However, despite Carthage's obvious military tactic advantage, it remained unable to capture Rome and was forced to return home to Carthage as its alliances fell around it. Carthage suffered a huge defeat in the end, as it became a client state of Rome, unable to raise an army without Rome's permission and more. However, despite these conditions, Rome was not yet done with Carthage.